How VCs Can Overcome the “Winner’s Curse”
商人普遍会对自己的成功前景做出过于乐观的预测。当创业者提供过于乐观的预测时，他们的投资者最终会感到失望。然而，投资者可能因鼓励创始人保持乐观而促成这个问题。风险投资家通常会推动创始人设立宏大、可怕、无畏的目标。当潜在投资者要求承诺在五年内实现可观的收入时，创始人通常会应承下来。
It is common for businesspeople to make excessively rosy predictions of their prospects for success. When entrepreneurs offer overly optimistic forecasts, their investors end up disappointed. But investors can contribute to this problem by encouraging founders to be optimistic. Venture capitalists often push founders to set big, hairy, audacious goals. When potential investors demand a promise of glorious revenues in five years, founders often oblige.
让我们考虑一下这些鼓励所产生的动力。为了简单起见，设想一个投资者（个人投资者或风险投资公司）为一笔100万美元的投资而在考虑几十家潜在的初创企业。利用创业者提供的信息，投资者会评估每个投资选项的预期价值。现在请把每个评估看成由两部分组成，信号和噪音。信号是对有用信息进行客观评估而产生的预期。此外，还有噪音或错误，它来自创业者的乐观偏见、他们对不确定事件选择性提供信息的行为，以及（某些）创始人提供的潜在夸张信息和其他失真信息。投资者会选择表面上具有最高预期回报的初创公司。利润预期最丰厚的初创企业很可能是因噪音而出现了向上的偏倚，从而导致投资者高估其价值。
Let’s consider the dynamics created by these incentives. For simplicity, imagine that one investor (an individual investor or a venture-capital firm) is considering dozens of potential start-ups for a single $1 million investment. Using the information provided by the entrepreneurs, the investor assesses the expected value of each investment option. Now think of each assessment as having two parts, signal and noise. The signal is the expectation that arises from an objective evaluation of useful information. In addition, there is also noise or error that comes from the optimistic bias of the entrepreneur, their selective provision of information about uncertain events, and potential exaggerations and other distortions provided by (some) founders. The investor chooses the start-up with the highest apparent expected payoff. The start-up with the most grandiose profit projection is likely to have been biased upward by noise, leading the investor to overestimate its value.
现在让我们把事情反转过来，想象一下一名初创企业的创始人成功地在潜在投资者之间发起了一场竞标。该创始人在寻求100万美元，并希望在换取这100万美元的时候以尽可能小的比例放弃公司。你是十个潜在的出资者之一。由于你愿意接受该公司为换取你的100万美元而提出的最低比例，创始人同意你提出的投资条件。你是否应该感到高兴？
Now let’s turn things around and imagine a start-up founder who manages to start a bidding war between potential investors. The founder is seeking $1 million and wants to give up the smallest percentage of the firm possible in return for the $1 million. You are one of ten potential funders. Due to your willingness to accept the lowest percentage of the firm in return for your $1 million, the founder agrees to the investment terms that you offered. Should you be happy?
马克斯(Max)与威廉·塞缪尔森(William Samuelson)的研究表明，你应该克制你的喜悦，因为你可能已经成为“赢家魔咒”的最新受害者。当许多投标方对价值不确定的目标竞标时，赢家通常付出的代价高于目标的价值。因此，中标更像是一种祸，而不是一种福。在这样的拍卖中，“胜出”的投资者不仅可能是对该公司估值最高的一方，而且可能是过高估计该公司价值最严重的一方。如果这种情况发生在你身上，你最终可能既会痛骂自己的不幸，又会诅咒骗你高估胜出之利的片面信号。
Max’s research with William Samuelson suggests that you should limit your celebration, because you may have just become the most recent victim of the “winner’s curse.” When many parties bid on a target of uncertain value, the winner typically pays more than the target is worth. Winning is thus more of a curse than a blessing. Not only is the “winning” investor in such an auction likely to be the one who placed the highest valuation on the firm, but they are also likely to be the one who most overestimated the value of the firm. If this happens to you, you may ultimately end up cursing both your misfortune and the biased signal that fooled you into overestimating the benefits of winning.
当人们没有考虑到其他人投标中存在的信息时，通常就会成为赢家魔咒的牺牲品。其他感兴趣的竞标者不愿意像你一样付出那么多代价，这一事实表明他们对目标的价值估计较低。如果这些谨慎的竞标者掌握着有用的信息，那么出价高过他们就很危险，因为这增加了你支付冤枉钱的风险。你出价胜过的对手越多，你付出过高代价的可能性就越大。击败大量信息灵通的对手有力地说明你支付的价格过高。因此，不确定商品的竞标者在与其他许多竞标者竞争时应该相应地压低他们的出价。然而，大多数人忽视了这一考虑，甚至随着竞标者数量的增多而更加激进地出价。
People typically fall prey to the winner’s curse when they fail to take into account the information present in others’ bids. The very fact that other interested bidders are not willing to pay as much as you are suggests they reached lower estimates of the target’s value. If those cautious bidders have useful information, then outbidding them is dangerous, because it increases the risk that you will overpay. The more rivals you outbid, the more likely you are to have paid too much. Winning against a large number of well-informed rivals strongly suggests you have overpaid. Thus, bidders on uncertain commodities competing against many other bidders should lower their bids accordingly. However, most people ignore this consideration, or even bid more aggressively as the number of bidders goes up.
新晋的工商管理硕士(MBA)们因受早期科技投资的巨额回报传说的诱惑，争先恐后地谋求风险投资公司的工作岗位。风投公司会坚守他们的决策策略，用这些策略来识别那些财富呈右偏态分布的少数初创企业。然而，尤因·考夫曼基金会(Ewing Kaufmann Foundation)2012年的一项研究发现，一般的风投基金勉强做到不赔不赚。为何实际表现如此之弱？赢家魔咒提供了部分的答案：风险投资家的投资对象通常是最过度乐观的初创企业创始人。总的来说，投资者会奖励那些提供了低质、向上偏倚预测的创始人。
Newly minted MBAs compete fiercely for jobs at venture capital firms, lured by legends of outsized returns from early tech investments. VCs closely guard the decision-making strategies they use to identify those few startups whose fortunes will land in the long right tail of the distribution. Yet a 2012 study by the Ewing Kaufmann Foundation found that the average venture capital fund barely broke even. Why is actual performance so weak? The winner’s curse provides part of the answer: Venture capitalists tend to invest in the most extravagantly overoptimistic start-up founders. Collectively, investors reward founders for providing low-quality, upwardly biased forecasts.
即使持怀疑态度的投资者对企业家的预测并不全信，他们也很难知道创始人在多大程度上夸大了他们的说法。获得更准确的信息将使风投公司能够做出更好的投资决定。他们如何才能获得这些信息呢？
Even if skeptical investors discount entrepreneurs’ forecasts, they will have difficulty knowing the extent to which founders have exaggerated their claims. Access to better information would enable VCs to make better investment decisions. How can they get it?
有一个鲜被使用的想法，它允许创始人对他们的预测下注。职业赌徒会用一句“要不要赌一把？”的邀请来挑战对方未必确定的主张。谈判者称这种赌博为或有合同。
One idea, used too rarely, allows founders to bet on their forecasts. Professional gamblers challenge each other’s improbable claims with the invitation “Wanna bet?” Negotiators call this wager a contingent contract.
为了说明这一点，让我们回到那个初创企业以500万美元估值寻求100万美元资金的案例。一个标准的合同可能会以公司20%的股份为条件提供100万美元。假设创始人根据特定时间表内的收入、利润或未来估值做出了一些可量化、可衡量的预测，作为投资者，接下来你可以提出一个报价，其中你以100万美元换取的公司股份比例取决于创始人实现其主张的能力。
To illustrate, let’s return to the case of the startup seeking $1 million in funding on a valuation of $5 million. A standard contract might provide the $1 million for 20% of the firm. Assume that the founder has made some quantifiable and measurable forecast based on revenues, profits, or future valuation within a specific timetable. As the investor, you could then make an offer in which the percent of the firm that you own for $1 million depends on the founder’s ability to meet their claims.
为简单起见，设想创始人预计公司在两年后下一轮融资时达到1000万美元的价值。现在你不必提供100万美元来换取这家初创企业20%的股份，而是可以提供100万美元以换取：
For simplicity’s sake, imagine that the founder predicts the company will be worth $10 million in two years, at the next round of funding. Instead of offering $1 million now for 20% of the start-up, you could offer $1 million in exchange for:
- 15%的公司股权，条件是新一轮融资会在两年内让公司估值达到1000万美元或更高。
- 20%的公司股权，条件是新一轮融资会在两年内让公司估值达到800万至1000万美元。
- 30%的公司股权，条件是公司的估值在两年内未超过800万美元。
- Fifteen percent of the firm if a new round of funding leads to a valuation of $10 million or more within two years,
- Twenty percent of the firm if a new round of funding leads to a valuation of $8-10 million within two years, or
- Thirty percent of the firm if the firm’s valuation does not exceed $8 million within two years.
请注意，当创始人相信她的说法时，这个报价对她的吸引力甚于用100万美元换取公司20%股份的报价。但如果创始人夸大了估计，她对你的报价就不太感兴趣。她勉为其难的态度透露了有价值的信息。如果创始人拒绝了你的或有合同，以换取其他人更慷慨的投资报价，你可能会感觉良好，因为你已经减少了遭受赢家魔咒的风险。
Notice that when the founder believes her claim, this offer will be more attractive to her than an offer of $1 million for 20% of the firm. But if the founder has exaggerated the estimate, she will become less interested in your offer. Her reluctance reveals valuable information. If the founder declines your contingent contract in exchange for someone else’s more generous investment offer, you can feel good that you have reduced your exposure to the winner’s curse.
更广义而言，领导者可以考虑如何创造一种环境，通过允许人们对他们口中说出的想法进行押注，引导其他人提供准确的信息。这一相同的解决方案也可以应用于内部融资。很多时候，领导者会奖励员工的乐观精神，而不是让他们对自己的预测负责。建立对准确性的激励机制可以成为帮助他人减少偏见的有用工具。结果是更好的决策——对领导者、员工、组织和更广泛的社会而言。
More broadly, leaders can think about how to create an environment that will lead others to provide accurate information by allowing people to bet on what they say they believe. This same solution can apply to internal funding. Too often, leaders reward employees for their optimism rather than holding them accountable for their predictions. Establishing incentives for accuracy can be a useful tool for helping others reduce bias. The result is better decisions—for leaders, employees, the organization, and the broader society.
本文摘自《决策领导：授权他人做出更好的选择》(Decision Leadership: Empowering Others to Make Better Choices)，作者唐·穆尔和马克斯·巴泽曼，耶鲁大学出版社出版。
唐·穆尔在加州大学伯克利分校哈斯商学院任洛兰·泰森·米切尔领导力学教授。他著有《完美自信：如何精明调整你的决定》(Perfectly Confident: How to Calibrate Your Decisions Wisely)（哈珀商业出版社， 2020年）。马克斯·巴泽曼是哈佛商学院杰西·伊西多·斯特劳斯工商管理学教授，（与唐·穆尔一起）著有《决策领导：授权他人做出更好的选择》(Decision Leadership: Empowering Others to Make Better Choices)（耶鲁大学出版社，2022年）和《更好而非完美：一个现实主义者如何最大程度实现可持续的善》（哈珀商业出版社，2020年）。
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