博柏利该何去何从？在安吉拉·阿伦茨(Angela Ahrendts) 就任博柏利（Burberry）CEO之前，这家英伦百年老店由于过度依赖品牌授权模式，正逐渐丧失自身的独特魅力。它的出路何在？集中化设计、对传统的核心产品进行革新是关键。

The Idea: Before Angela Ahrendts became Burberry’s CEO, licensing threatened to destroy the brand’s unique strengths. The answer? Centralize design and focus on innovating core heritage products.

2006年6月我出任博柏利CEO时，奢侈品行业正在全球范围内迅猛增长。博柏利作为一个以防水风衣（Trench Coat）闻名的百年老牌，本应在这一浪潮中占得先机，但事实上我们的年增长额仅有2%。个中原因何在？

When I became the CEO of Burberry, in July 2006, luxury was one of the fastest-growing sectors in the world. With its rich history, centered on trench coats that were recognized around the world, the Burberry brand should have had many advantages.

第一次召开管理层战略规划会议时，我就发现了一个问题：面对阴郁、潮湿的典型英式天气，来自世界各地的60多位高管，竟没有一个人穿着博柏利的经典风衣——我甚至怀疑其中许多人从未买过一件。如果公司的管理者们宁可浪费诱人的内部折扣也不买自家产品，我们又怎能期待消费者心甘情愿地为它们买单？

But as I watched my top managers arrive for our first strategic planning meeting, something struck me right away. They had flown in from around the world to classic British weather, gray and damp, but not one of these more than 60 people was wearing a Burberry trench coat. I doubt that many of them even owned one. If our top people weren’t buying our products, despite the great discount they could get, how could we expect customers to pay full price for them?

这件事折射出了博柏利所面临的危机。尽管博柏利拥有绝佳的商业基础，但在全球扩张的过程中却失去了自己的重心。我们在全球共有23家品牌授权经销商，每家经营的业务各不相同；公司的产品无所不包，上至男女服饰，下至宠物用品，位于伦敦邦德街的一家专卖店甚至有一整个分区专卖各式各样的苏格兰短裙。这些产品分开看都没有什么问题，合在一起却显得缺乏重点——人人都能找到自己需要的产品，但没有一种产品是独一无二、人人都想要的。

It was a sign of the challenges we faced. Even in a burgeoning global market, Burberry was growing at only 2% a year. The company had an excellent foundation, but it had lost its focus in the process of global expansion. We had 23 licensees around the world, each doing something different. We were selling products such as dog cover-ups and leashes. One of our highest-profile stores, on Bond Street in London, had a whole section of kilts. There’s nothing wrong with any of those products individually, but together they added up to just a lot of stuff—something for everybody, but not much of it exclusive or compelling.

对于奢侈品行业而言，“随处可见”是致命的——这意味着你不再是真正的奢侈品了。而我们正在走向“随处可见”。博柏利不能仅仅做大众所喜爱的老牌英国公司，它必须直面强大的对手，在竞争中成长为国际一线奢侈品牌。

In luxury, ubiquity will kill you—it means you’re not really luxury anymore. And we were becoming ubiquitous. Burberry needed to be more than a beloved old British company. It had to develop into a great global luxury brand while competing against much larger rivals.

在奢侈品的竞技场上，酩悦轩尼诗-路易威登集团（LVMH）的收入几乎是博柏利的12倍，而巴黎春天集团（PPR）的收入更是博柏利的16倍还不止。我们希望在全球精英群体的可支配收入中分一杯羹，但要分到这杯羹，我们就必须在全世界增长最快的消费者市场中占据显要地位。从多方面来看，这场战争不啻于大卫与歌利亚之战。

Among luxury players, Louis Vuitton Moët Hennessy (LVMH) had almost 12 times—and Pinault-Printemps-Redoute (PPR) more than 16 times—Burberry’s revenue. We wanted a share of the disposable income of the world’s most elite buyers—and to win it, we’d have to fight for prime real estate in the world’s most rapidly growing consumer markets. In many ways, it felt like a David-and-Goliath battle.

扶植“品牌独裁者”

One “Brand Czar”

表面上看来，我似乎不适合担任博柏利的CEO：我来自美国印第安纳州的一座小镇，毕业于波尔州立大学（Ball State University），是典型的美国中西部人，而博柏利却是一家英伦气息十足的公司。我刚入职时，英国《金融时报》就曾抓住这一点大做文章，极尽冷嘲热讽之能事。但是，我曾有幸与丽兹·克莱本（Liz Claiborne）、公司前CEO保罗·查伦（Paul Charron）、DKNY品牌创始人兼设计师唐娜·凯伦（Donna Karen）等时尚产业最顶尖的领导者共事，从他们身上学到了不少经营之道，而我长达25年的从业经验也是一大优势。

On the surface, I might have seemed an unlikely CEO for a company that was considered quintessentially British. I was raised in a small town in Indiana and educated at Ball State University. I was a classic midwesterner—something the Financial Times had fun mocking when I first took the job. But I’d been fortunate enough to work with and learn from some of the most inspirational leaders in the fashion industry, from Paul Charron to Donna Karan. And I had 25 years of experience on my side.

此外，我能胜任这个职位还有一个重要原因：我对大品牌一向怀有敬意，这些年来也参与过好几个品牌的创立。我热爱品牌一以贯之的素质——无论身处世界哪个角落，你都能在苹果零售店获得同等品质的体验，在星巴克用同样款式的杯子喝到同样口味的拿铁。始终如一的消费体验就是最好的品牌营销方式。

I also clearly had one attribute that made me a good fit: I admire and respect great brands and helped to build some over the years. From Apple to Starbucks, I love the consistency—knowing that anywhere in the world you can depend on having the same experience in the store or being served a latte with the same taste and in the same cup. That’s great branding.

不幸的是，博柏利在这方面差强人意。尽管我们的专卖店遍布全球，但顾客在任何一家门店得到的体验都可能与上一家截然不同。在上任之初，我花了六个月时间与前任共同工作，一同飞往世界各地感受博柏利的运营状态。在香港，我会见了一位设计总监及其团队，她自豪地向我展示了她们为香港市场打造的产品线：Polo衫、针织衬衫以及一切带有博柏利经典格子图案的单品，唯独没有外套。随后我们飞往美国，会见了另一支设计团队，他们专门设计外衣，但价格档次仅为英国本土的一半。更让人无法容忍的是，他们设计的外衣是在新泽西州的工厂生产的——这意味着我们生产的经典款博柏利风雨衣竟带有“美国制造”的标签。后来我得知公司在意大利和德国都有授权经销商，他们生产的风衣甚至比美国生产的更便宜。

Unfortunately, Burberry didn’t have a lot of that. An experience in any given Burberry store in the world might be very different from the customer’s previous one. As part of my transition, I spent six months working closely with my predecessor, hitting the road to get a sense of Burberry worldwide. In Hong Kong, I was introduced to a design director and her team, who proudly showed me the line they were creating for that market: polo shirts and woven shirts and everything with the famous Burberry check, but not a single coat. Then we went to America, where I was introduced to another design director and design team. This team was creating outerwear, but at half the price point of that in the UK. Furthermore, the coats were being manufactured in New Jersey. So we were making classic Burberry raincoats that said “Made in the U.S.A.” I later learned that we had outerwear licensees in Italy and Germany making trench coats that were even cheaper than those in the United States.

一个顶尖的国际品牌，绝不会把产品的设计和生产权随随便便地交给散布在世界各地的设计师和制造商。我们面对的问题显而易见：如果博柏利想成为纯正的国际一线奢侈品牌，就必须有一位全球设计总监。我们有一位了不起的年轻设计师，名叫克里斯托弗·贝利（Christopher Bailey），我在唐娜·凯伦旗下工作期间曾与他共事，深知他的天赋。因此，我一上任就指定他为博柏利的“品牌独裁者”，并告诉整个团队：“我们的消费者在全球任何一个地方看到的任何一件产品，都必须经过克里斯托弗的审批，没有例外。”

Great global brands don’t have people all over the world designing and producing all kinds of stuff. It became quite clear that if Burberry was going to be a great, pure, global luxury brand, we had to have one global design director. We had an incredible young designer named Christopher Bailey, with whom I’d worked at Donna Karan and who I knew was a sensational talent. So I introduced him early on as the “brand czar.” I told the team, “Anything that the consumer sees—anywhere in the world—will go through his office. No exceptions.”

在接下来的一年之内，我们将所有的设计工作集中到英国本土，由克里斯托弗全权监管；香港设计团队全部解散，美国团队中负责设计外衣的部分成员被调到了英国。我们关闭了美国新泽西工厂和英国威尔士一家生产Polo衫的工厂，将资金投向位于英国约克郡卡斯尔福德（Castleford）镇的生产基地，这里是博柏利最经典的防水风衣的诞生地。关闭威尔士工厂引起了一场政治风波，我甚至不得不和博柏利集团德高望重的董事长一起在国会面前作证，但我们仍然坚持自己的立场。

Within a year we had let the entire Hong Kong design team go and had brought some of the U.S. outerwear team to the UK, where we centralized all our design under Christopher. We closed the New Jersey factory—along with one in Wales that was making polo shirts—and began investing in our Castleford facility in Yorkshire, which makes our heritage rainwear. Closing the Welsh factory caused a political firestorm—I was even called to testify before Parliament alongside Burberry’s highly respected chairman—but we stood behind our decision.

作为一家企业，我们的一切努力都是为了品牌的利益，因为我们的职责就是维护公司的品牌，确保品牌活力十足、方向明确。虽然眼下我们不得不为此关闭一间300人的工厂，但只要博柏利的品牌价值得到提升，就能在未来创造更多的就业机会。事实证明，我们的选择是正确的：自2006年以来，博柏利卡斯尔福德工厂的雇员增加了1倍，全球雇员总数提高了两倍，现已接近1万人；仅在过去两年间，我们就为英国增加了1000个就业机会。

As a company, we always do what’s best for the brand, because our job is to protect it and keep it powerful and relevant. If we do that, even if it involves closing a factory with 300 employees, many more jobs will be created in time. We’ve doubled the head count at Castleford since then and almost tripled our global workforce to nearly 10,000, adding more than 1,000 jobs in the UK over the past two years alone.

抓住品牌核心

Sticking to the Core

博柏利已有156年的历史。早在第一次世界大战期间，英国士兵就在战壕中穿着博柏利防水风衣，这也是这款风衣名称的由来（Trench原意为“战壕”）。其后数十年间，这款风衣成了英伦文化的一部分，博柏利公司甚至获准成为英国王室的指定供应商。欧内斯特·沙克尔顿（Ernest Shackleton）爵士远赴南极时便穿着一件博柏利，许多传奇巨星穿着博柏利登上银幕。在一个多世纪的时间里，博柏利风衣就是“酷”的象征。然而，当我就任CEO时，博柏利的战略重点却是各类时髦服装和带有格子图案的配饰，外衣类产品仅占该品牌全球销量的20%。经过反复考量，我们越来越清楚地认识到，这种策略与博柏利作为一个奢侈品牌的发展愿景是不相符的。

Burberry is 156 years old; its coats were worn in the trenches of World War I by British soldiers, and for decades thereafter they were so much a part of British culture that the company earned a royal warrant, making it an official supplier to the royal family. Sir Ernest Shackleton wore a Burberry during his Antarctic expedition. Movie legends wore them on the silver screen. For more than a century the Burberry trench coat was cool. But when I became CEO, outerwear represented only about 20% of our global brand business. Fashion apparel and check accessories were leading our strategy. The more we examined the situation, the clearer it became that this wasn’t consistent with our luxury vision.

奢侈品企业以单个产品起家后扩大经营的例子并不少见，路易威登最初就是凭借行李箱出名，古琦则以皮具打下江山，但这些品牌扩大经营后，仍然把最初的核心产品作为主要利润来源。纵观整个奢侈品行业，我们意识到博柏利是惟一一个没有很好地利用品牌历史底蕴的奢侈品公司。我们既没有把传统产品视为企业的骄傲，也没有在传统的基础上不断创新。

It’s not unusual for a luxury company to be born from a single product and then diversify. Louis Vuitton began with luggage, and Gucci with leather goods. But even as they diversified, each continued to earn the majority of its revenue from its original core products. Surveying the industry, we realized that Burberry was the only iconic luxury company that wasn’t capitalizing on its historical core. We weren’t proud of it. We weren’t innovating around it.

博柏利品牌是靠独有的防水华达呢（Gabardine）面料起家的，当年托马斯·博柏利创造这种面料及相应的风衣款式，主要是为了满足军事及探险需求。幸好，我们还没有把这种专利面料交给远在异国他乡的代工厂生产。我们自己的纺织厂就设在英国北部的约克郡，离卡斯尔福德镇的风衣生产厂很近。一个历史悠久的正宗老牌配上一条高效的垂直生产链，还有什么能比这种模式更棒？然而，我们却没有对这条生产链进行投资，没有充分发挥其作用，我们几乎忽略了自己最重要的资产。

Furthermore, we were almost ignoring some of our strongest assets. Our weaving facility in Yorkshire produced the exclusive waterproof gabardine on which the company was founded. Thomas Burberry had created this fabric and the trench coat design for those early military and exploration commissions. The weaving facility was near the Castleford trench coat factory, in the north of England—fortunately, we hadn’t resorted to outsourcing in faraway places. What could be better than an authentic heritage brand with a great vertical supply chain? But we weren’t investing in it. We weren’t optimizing it.

为了确定下一步经营战略，我们先进行了一番头脑风暴，把直觉整理成清晰的思路；随后，我们雇了一家咨询公司为博柏利提供竞争对标分析（Competitive Benchmarking）。分析结果肯定了我们的直觉，指明了博柏利未来的前进方向：我们要强调并发展我们的传统核心产品，在不断革新的同时将其作为博柏利的经营中心，以此巩固我们的品牌文化，突出我们的英伦气质。

After brainstorming and formalizing our instincts, we commissioned a consulting firm to provide us with competitor benchmarking. Our instincts confirmed, we clearly saw the way forward: We would reinforce our heritage, our Britishness, by emphasizing and growing our core luxury products, innovating them and keeping them at the heart of everything we did. I have to admit that some managers were cynical. A lot of them had been at Burberry for a really long time. I’m sure they left saying, “Focusing on trench coats—that’s our strategy?” But most of us were confident that it was the right plan.

风衣精神

The Ethos of the Trench

一开始，部分高管对我的决策不以为然，其中不乏博柏利的资深员工。我敢打赌，散会后他们肯定在说“把防水风衣作为重心——这算是什么战略？”但总体而言，持怀疑态度的是少数，大部分人都对以传统产品为核心的战略充满了信心。整个企业的创造力得到高度激发，从克里斯托弗带领的设计团队到市场部营销人员，都开始构想如何将“风衣精神”体现在新品发布会、门店布置等方方面面。

The decision to focus on our heritage opened up a wealth of creativity. Christopher and the designers and marketers all started dreaming up ways to reinforce the idea that everything we did—from our runway shows to our stores—should start with the ethos of the trench.

与此同时，博柏利的传统公司结构也要进行调整，以反映全新的、更加纯粹的产品观念。我们有一流的人才，但我们的组织结构却像一家百货公司：男装类目下的每一个部门各由一个人负责，女装类目下的每一个部门也各由一个人负责，这些负责人做出的决策在他们各自的部门里或许行得通，但对整个公司的经营却毫无帮助。我们必须做出改变，着眼大局，把品牌作为一切工作的立足点。除了让克里斯托弗监管所有设计工作，我们还要聘请一批职能专家，其中一位管理公司资源、一位负责策划，另一位则主管供应链。这些调整听起来平淡无奇，但对于实现我们的目标却必不可少。

At the same time, we had to shift Burberry’s historical corporate structure to reflect this new, purer point of view. We had great people, but we were organized like a department store. We had a person over each men’s category and a person over each women’s category. They made decisions that worked for their departments but might not make sense for the whole business. We needed to change, to focus on the big picture: the brand. In addition to putting Christopher in charge of all design, we had to hire functional expertise—a head of corporate resources, a head of planning, and a chief supply chain officer. It was all pretty basic, but necessary if we were to reach our goals.

为了强化零售业务，我们决定主攻已有竞争对手涉足的市场，因为竞争品牌的出现意味着该市场中存在能够支持奢侈品牌的消费群体。我们在全球范围内选取博柏利尚未进驻、但已出现两个同档品牌的市场，迈出扩张计划的第一步。在过去六年间，我们新增了132间门店，并成功地将零售重点转移到外衣类产品上。

To strengthen our retail operation, we decided to focus on markets where our competitors already had a presence, signaling the right kind of consumers to support a luxury brand. As our first blueprint for expansion, we identified every market in the world where two of our peers had stores and we had none. In the past six years we’ve opened 132 new stores, and we’ve refocused our retailing staff on outerwear.

防水风衣是我们最昂贵的产品之一（不少风衣单件售价超过1000美金），但也是推销力度最弱的环节。我们的店员卖出一件风衣所获的提成胜过卖10件Polo衫，但他们仍然习惯于销售Polo衫等相对低端、容易卖出的产品，这不是因为他们算不清这笔帐，而是因为他们缺乏有效的工具，不能充分展现博柏利风衣的价值，也不能告诉消费者为什么风衣才是最明智的选择。为此，我们建立了强大的销售与服务项目，把产品教育置于核心位置。为了证明博柏利的精细做工，我们专门制作了视频，展示每一件风衣的领子是如何手工卷边、缝纫的；我们还给门店配备了音像设备，给销售助理配备了iPad，以求达到最好的播放效果。我们深知，赏心悦目、极具说服力的展示内容会在消费者、博柏利品牌以及我们的标志性风衣之间建立牢固的纽带。

Trench coats are among the most expensive items we sell (many of them are priced over $1,000), but the staff was least equipped to sell them. Our salespeople had become accustomed to selling what was easy—relatively inexpensive items such as polo shirts. On commission, they’d be better off selling one trench coat than 10 polo shirts. They understood the math, but they needed tools to fully appreciate and communicate why the trench was the best investment for their customers. We established strong sales and service programs to put product education front and center. We created videos to demonstrate Burberry craftsmanship: All the collars are hand-rolled and hand-stitched. We equipped our sales associates with iPads and our stores with audiovisual technology to show these videos to best effect. We knew that beautiful, compelling content would connect customers to the brand and our iconic trench.

另一方面，我们不再信奉“人人皆上帝”，开始将注意力集中到未来的奢侈品用户群——新新人类（millennials，上世纪80年后出生的一代）身上。我们相信这一消费群体尚未获得同类竞争品牌的足够重视；换句话说，这是我们的“蓝海”。这一决定也引起了一定的争议，毕竟我们瞄准的一代人太过年轻，他们对博柏利的核心产品一无所知。因此，我们应该以设计作为主要卖点——我们要创造出更新颖、更酷的外衣，吸引顾客反复购买。过去，博柏利的防水风衣只有几个基本款，多以米色为主，配上标志性的格子衬里，顶多有些细节差异。现在我们有超过三百个库存单位（SKU），从斗篷、夹克到博柏利经典款，颜色、款式丰富多样，有的带貂皮领子，有的配以鳄鱼皮肩章，有的采取真皮质地、镶嵌铆钉的袖子。除此之外，我们在新产品中也注入了传统元素。

We also began to shift our marketing efforts from targeting everyone, everywhere, to focusing on the luxury customers of the future: millennials. We believed that these customers were being ignored by our competitors. This was our white space. The decision was not without controversy; we were choosing to aim squarely at a generation that had no current knowledge of Burberry’s core product. The effort had to be led by design—we needed to create outerwear that was innovative, cool, and so inviting that people would become repeat customers. Burberry used to have just a few basic styles of trench coats: Almost all were beige with the signature check lining, and the differences between them were minor. Now we have more than 300 SKUs, from capes and cropped jackets to the classic Burberry trench in a range of vibrant colors and styles, with everything from mink collars and alligator epaulets to studded leather sleeves.

我们还要面向新的目标顾客群重新构思营销方式，并将其数字化。博柏利原本有几个地区性网站，于是我们对这些网站进行升级改造，并在同一平台上重新设计每一个细节。新平台像橱窗一样展示博柏利的方方面面，是我们一切市场推广与品牌营销的中心；同时，我们确保你访问博柏利网站时，第一眼看见的画面一定包括我们的经典风衣。网站包括大量与品牌相关的感性内容，如原创音乐、主题电影、品牌传统、品牌故事等，旨在引起新新人类的兴趣。我们深知这一切的重要性——每周访问博柏利网络平台的用户超过我们所有门店的客流量总和。另一个针对新新人类客户群采取的措施，是员工年轻化。我们公司在伦敦总部工作的大部分员工都不到30岁，他们懂得我们想争取的是一群什么样的人。

We had to infuse the new lines with our heritage. We also had to rethink our entire marketing approach for these customers—to make it digital. When we began, we had a few regional websites, so we consolidated them and redesigned everything on one platform. It showcases every facet of the brand. It has become the hub of all our marketing and branding, and a trench coat is always one of the first things you see when you go online. The site is designed to speak to that millennial consumer through emotive brand content: music, movies, heritage, storytelling. And we understand how critical it is. More people visit our platform every week than walk into all our stores combined. And the majority of our employees at corporate headquarters in London are under 30. They understand who we are trying to reach.

如今，博柏利每一项重要的新举措都以防水风衣为中心。2009年我们推出了第一个社会化媒体平台artofthetrench.com，其主题就是博柏利的标志性风衣和穿着这款风衣的人。至今为止，这个网站的访问量已超过250万。去年，博柏利在定制服务领域迈出了第一步，而我们理所当然地选择了防水风衣作为起点：“博柏利定制”为用户提供近1200万种可选风衣款式，它们首先在Burberry.com上线，现正逐步被引入伦敦和芝加哥的实体门店。明年博柏利将正式收回香水和化妆品业务，届时我们就能更好地发挥博柏利的“风衣精神”。我们发行的Body系列香水已经在这方面树立了一个成功的先例。

Now every major new initiative has the trench coat front and center. In 2009 it was the inspiration for our first social media platform, artofthetrench.com. Celebrating the iconic trench and the people who wear it, the site has had more than 2.5 million visitors to date. Last year, when we took our first step into customization, it was never in question that we would launch with the iconic trench. Burberry Bespoke went live on burberry.com offering some 12 million possible styles, and we are now introducing it in our physical stores in London and Chicago. And as we take direct control of our fragrance and beauty business next year, we will fully leverage the trench—as we did so successfully in the launch of Burberry Body perfume.

转型的回报

Rewards of the Transformation

从某种角度来说，我们又回到了出发点。我常常提醒员工，创立企业的不是我们，是托马斯·博柏利。他创业时年仅21岁，充满了创造力。我们常说博柏利品牌让他的精神不死，而我们这一代的责任就是续写他的传奇。

In a way, we’re right back to our roots. I always remind employees that we didn’t found the company, Thomas Burberry did—at the age of 21. He was young. He was innovative. We say that his spirit lives on, and that it’s this generation’s job to keep his legacy going.

公司的转型得到了回报。如今，服装占我们总业务的60%，其中外衣类产品占到了一半以上。2012财年结束时，博柏利的总收入达到了30亿美元，经营利润约6亿美元，比五年前翻了一番。

The company transformation paid off. Today 60% of our business is apparel, and outerwear makes up more than half of that. At the end of fiscal 2012, Burberry’s revenues and operating income had doubled over the previous five years, to $3 billion and $600 million, respectively.

尽管转型初见成效，但这并不意味着博柏利的转型顺风顺水、毫无波折。我们花费了几年时间和无数心血才把博柏利拉回正轨。全球奢侈品市场极具周期性，我们仍需小心翼翼地驾驶这艘大船在起伏不定的水域中航行。2012年9月，我们打破惯例，在发布季度财报之前预先发布了销售业绩；从业绩上看，全球市场交易量正在下滑。几周之后，我们对这些数字有了进一步认识：尽管交易量下滑，但公司的实际销售质量反而提升了。我们发现交易价值、转换率均有所提高，消费者对我们的两个高端副牌——珀松（Prorsum）和伦敦产品线的需求也有所增加。所以，尽管低端消费者变得更加谨慎了，博柏利品牌与我们的核心奢侈品消费群体之间的共鸣反而比以往更强。

That’s not to say it has all been smooth sailing. Getting Burberry back on track took years of hard work, and we’re still navigating tricky waters in a cyclical global luxury market. In September 2012 we took the unusual step of issuing a sales update ahead of our quarterly earnings report: We were seeing a slowdown in traffic globally. A few weeks later, with better insight into the numbers, we were able to report that although traffic was down, the quality of our sales was actually improving: We were realizing higher transaction values, better conversion rates, and greater demand for our more elevated Prorsum and London lines. So although the aspirational customers at entry price points are behaving more cautiously, the brand is resonating ever more strongly with our core luxury audience.

我们一直表示，宏观经济的起伏必然会对博柏利产生影响，但公司愿景不会因此改变。我们的战略无比清晰坚定，并已经过实践的证明，因此我们对未来很长一段时间的发展充满信心。这就是我们经营企业的方式，也是打造一个伟大国际品牌的方式。

We’ve always said we’re not immune to the ebb and flow of the macroeconomy, but that doesn’t change our vision. We have absolute clarity about—and commitment to—our proven strategies, which gives us confidence for the long term. That’s how we run our business and how a great global brand is created.

2011年，博柏利被Interbrand和WPP/BrandZ同时选为全球增长最快的品牌第四位（Interbrand排出的前三位依次为苹果、谷歌和亚马逊，WPP/BrandZ排出的前三位则是Facebook、百度和富国银行）。2012年，博柏利成为Interbrand排行榜上增长最快的奢侈品品牌。这一切远超我们在2006年那场战略规划会议上的预期。

In 2011 Burberry was named the fourth fastest-growing brand globally by both Interbrand (behind Apple, Google, and Amazon) and WPP/BrandZ (behind Facebook, Baidu, and Wells Fargo). In 2012 it was the fastest-growing luxury brand on Interbrand’s index. That’s beyond what we imagined was possible back in that strategy meeting in 2006.

如今，博柏利公司内部对我们当初定下的战略早已不再有任何疑问，防水风衣理应作为我们最具吸引力、最有代表性的产品，这是我们所有决策的基础。我们的销售助理也知道这一点——这款产品就代表了我们的身份。现在，我已经能从博柏利员工上班时的着装中清楚地看到这种“风衣精神”。如果你问一位博柏利高级主管拥有几件防水风衣，你得到的回答可能是八到九件：人人都有一件便携款、一件晚装款和一件白色款，人人都有长款、短款和中长款。 你问我有几件？具体数字我不清楚，不过我可以负责任地告诉你，至少有一打。博柏利防水风衣已经不仅是一件服装，更是一个伟大品牌、一个伟大企业的基石。

Today it’s taken for granted inside the company that the trench coat must remain our most exciting, most iconic product. It guides all our decisions. Our sales associates understand it. This product is who we are. That is evident when I observe what our employees wear to work. If you ask a Burberry senior executive how many trench coats he or she owns, the answer is likely to be eight or nine. Everyone has a packable version. Everyone has a white one. Everyone has an evening one. We have all different lengths. As for me, I don’t have an exact count, but I can safely confess to owning a dozen. They’re not just raincoats anymore. They are the foundation of a great brand and a great company. 

译/殷宴

校/安健